

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION AF-04

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NEA-07 H-01 INR-05 PM-03 PRS-01  
SP-02 IO-06 EUR-08 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
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INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

S E C R E T ABIDJAN 2559

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, XA, IV  
SUBJECT: HOUPHOUET'S VIEWS ON CAIRO SUMMIT  
CONFERENCE AND RELATED MATTERS

REF: ABIDJAN 2537, ABIDJAN 2558(NOTAL)

1. IN MEETING THIS MORNING WITH PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-  
BOIGNY AT HIS RESIDENCE IN COCODY HE TOUCHED ON SEVERAL  
SUBJECTS OF CURRENT INTEREST, NOTABLY HIS VIEWS OF JUST  
CONCLUDED AFRO-ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN CAIRO AND  
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EVOLVING SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

2. HOUPHOUET SAID THAT HE WAS LESS THAN SATISFIED WITH  
THE RESULTS OF THE CAIRO MEETING. IT HAD FURTHER CONVINCED  
HIM THAT BLACK AFRICANS WERE BEING FORCED BY ARABS TO  
ENDORSE UNCRITICALLY MAXIMUM ARAB DEMANDS IN MIDDLE EAST  
WHILE RECEIVING LITTLE TANGIBLE HELP FROM ARABS ON

AFRICAN PROBLEMS. HOUPHOUET WAS PARTICULARLY ANNOYED THAT THE ZIONISM-RACISM ISSUE HAD SURFACED AGAIN IN CAIRO, ALBEIT IN SLIGHTLY DILUTED FORM, AND SAID THAT ONCE AGAIN, AS AT COLOMBO NONALIGNED CONFERENCE, IVORY COAST HAD RESERVED ITS POSITION IN WRITING TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE WERE LIMITS TO IVORIAN WILLINGNESS TO ESPOUSE ARAB POSITION. HOUPHOUET WENT ON TO SAY THAT NOTHING WAS TO BE GAINED FROM LINKING MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS. ON THE CONTRARY SUCH LINKAGE WOULD COMPLICATE PROBLEMS IN BOTH AREAS. IN HIS MEETINGS EARLIER THIS YEAR WITH ISRAELI MINISTER RABIN AND THE PALESTINIANS IN GENEVA AND PARIS HOUPHOUET HAD COME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MAIN ANTAGONISTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE "EXHAUSTED" AND WISHED TO FIND SOME WAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE AFRICAN STATES COULD PLAY A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE BY ENCOURAGING A REALISTIC DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS THAN BY LINING UP BEHIND THE ARABS IN ANOTHER CONFRONTATION. EQUATING ZIONISM WITH RACISM SIMPLY IMPEDED NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THE AFRICAN STATES DIMINISHED THEIR OWN INFLUENCE BY SUBSCRIBING TO SUCH FORMULATIONS.

3. TURNING TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, HOUPHOUET SAID THAT HE CONTINUED TO BE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE DIRECTION IN WHICH EVENTS WERE TURNING. HE BELIEVED THAT THE SUPPORT BEING GIVEN BY THE FRONT LINE LEADERS TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT STRENGTHENED THE HANDS OF THE SOVIETS AND LENT PLAUSIBILITY TO IAN SMITH'S MANEUVERING FOR AN "INTERNAL SOLUTION." HOUPHOUET OBSERVED THAT THE ACTION OF THE FRONT LINE FIVE HAD CREATED PROBLEMS FOR OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS LIKE  
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HIMSELF. DESPITE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT HE RECEIVE SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA DURING THEIR RESPECTIVE VISITS TO THE IVORY COAST, HE HAD DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM RECEIVING THEM--ALTHOUGH SITHOLE IN PARTICULAR HE KNEW WELL--BECAUSE SUCH MEETINGS WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE LED TO CHARGES THAT HOUPHOUET WAS UNDERMINING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

4. CONTINUING IN THIS VEIN, HOUPHOUET SAID THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE LESSON ON ANGOLA HAD NOT BEEN LEARNED. QUESTION OF WHICH NATIONALIST LEADERS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN A POST-LIBERATION GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE COULD NOT BE DECIDED IN ADVANCE. THE FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES WHICH GUARANTEED THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD MAJORITY RULE WOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE. ONCE THAT WAS DONE THERE WOULD BE TIME ENOUGH TO WORK OUT COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT BASED ON MAJORITY RULE. THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE BY THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE THEMSELVES. IT COULD NOT BE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE BY OTHER AFRICANS.

5. AS MATTERS NOW STOOD, SAID HOUPHOUET, MOMENTUM WAS ON THE SIDE

OF THOSE WHO FAVORED ARMED STRUGGLE RATHER THAN NEGOTIATION, THE MOST INTRANSIGENT WHITES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE MOST INTRANSIGENT BLACKS ON THE OTHER. IF THIS POLARIZATION CONTINUED THE MODERATES WOULD BE SQUEEZED OUT ALTOGETHER. HOUPHOUET BELIEVED THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES HAD THE POWER AND PRESTIGE TO RETRIEVE A DETERIORATING SITUATION. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO SEE THE ATTENTION BEING GIVEN TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND HOPED THIS MEANT THAT WE WERE PREPARING NEW INITIATIVES. IF LARGE SCALE FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN THE SMITH REGIME AND NATIONALIST FORCES IT WOULD SPREAD THROUGHOUT ALL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE WESTERN POWERS AND THE MODERATE AFRICANS WOULD BE LEFT ON THE SIDELINES, AS THEY HAD BEEN IN ANGOLA, AND THE SOVIETS WOULD CALL THE SHOTS.

6. AFTER THANKING HOUPHOUET FOR SHARING HIS VIEWS WITH ME AND SAYING THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS COMMENTS TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY, I OBSERVED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND ABOUT THE SECRET

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IMPORTANCE THAT WASHINGTON ATTACHED TO FINDING A PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WHILE THE DANGERS OUTLINED BY HOUPHOUET WERE REAL I BELIEVED PERSONALLY THAT THE SITUATION WAS FAR FROM HOPELESS. THE MOST INFLUENTIAL OF THE FRONT LINE LEADERS WOULD I THOUGHT, BE AS UNWILING AS HOUPHOUET HIMSELF TO PERMIT A DOMINANT SOVIET ROLE TO DEVELOP IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE UNITED STATES HAD CLOSE TIES WITH THESE LEADERS AND WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO BRING ABOUT MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA BY PEACEFUL MEANS. IN THIS ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT ENDEAVOR, THE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF HOUPHOUET HIMSELF WOULD CONTINUE TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. FOR THIS REASON I WAS SURE HIS VIEWS WOULD RECEIVE CLOSE ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON. STEARNS

SECRET

NNN

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